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Institutional Differences, Foreign Ownership Modes, Marketing 
Capabilities and Domestic Technological Catch-up: Evidence from India  
This research examines FDI-mediated domestic firms’ technological catch up by 
considering institutional differences between home and host countries, the role of 
marketing capabilities and the joint effects of institutional differences and the degree of 
foreign ownership. Using firm-level panel data for Indian manufacturing industries, we 
find that FDI-mediated technological catch up in domestic firms are conditional on 
institutional differences between the home and host country of multinational enterprises 
and the level of marketing capabilities of foreign-owned affiliates. In addition, we find 
that technological catch up in domestic firms are likely to be positively influenced by 
the presence of wholly foreign-owned firms from institutionally close countries 
whereas we find some evidence that the presence of minority foreign-owned firms may 
have a negative effect on domestic technological catch-up, regardless of institutional 
differences. We also provide theoretical and policy implications of our findings. 
Keywords: foreign ownership modes, India, institutional differences, marketing 
capabilities, technological catch-up 
1. Introduction 
An extensive literature on FDI-mediated technological catch up from foreign direct 
investment (FDI) has emerged in the last few years (Görg and Greenaway 2004; Wooster and 
Diebel, 2010). There have been calls for discriminating approaches to identify how and when 
FDI generates technological catch up in domestic firms, especially within the context of FDI 
heterogeneity (Smeets 2008). Rather than conceptualising FDI as homogenous capital flows 
transferred across national boundaries, emphasis is placed on developing models that 
incorporate FDI heterogeneity, especially at firm-level (Fortanier 2007; Javorcik and 
Spatareanu 2008).  
Given the scholarly emphasis on a contingency based approach to investigating FDI-
mediated technological catch-up (Meyer and Sinani 2009; Zhang et al. 2010), India is an 
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interesting context to study as there are relatively few published studies that have employed 
such an approach and used firm-level data to investigate technological catch-up (Kathuria 
2002; Marin and Sasidharan 2010). On one hand, Kathuria (2002) using a sample of 487 
firms (which included 116 foreign firms), found that domestic technological catch up occurs 
only in those Indian firms that has sufficient absorptive capacity, i.e. firms with a threshold 
level of R&D investments. On the other hand, Marin and Sashidharan (2010) capturing 
another firm heterogeneity issue, i.e. technological orientation of foreign firms, and using a 
large sample (12,443 firms including 273 foreign firms) found that competence-creating FDI 
had a positive effect whereas competence-exploiting FDI had a negative effect on domestic 
technological catch-up. This study builds on Kathuria (2002) research by including 
absorptive capacity as a control (i.e. firm size and R&D intensity) and tackles few important 
foreign firm heterogeneity factors to investigate their influence on domestic firms’ prospects 
for technological catch-up. Thus, by adopting a contingency approach, the research explores 
domestic technological catch-up by considering three foreign firm heterogeneity factors, 
namely, the role of institutional differences, marketing capabilities and generic foreign 
ownership modes.  
Institutional differences are likely to arise when multinational enterprises (MNEs), 
the agents of FDI, manoeuvre through host country institutions which can be significantly 
different from the home country (Kostova 1999). The effects of such differences on FDI-
mediated domestic catch-up may be two-fold. First, the degree of institutional differences 
would influence transactions costs because MNEs have to cope with often quite different 
regulatory rules and administrative and legal systems in a host country (Brouthers 2002). 
They may be exposed to political hazards (Delios and Henisz 2000), which could affect 
strategic decision-making (Ingram and Clay 2000) especially in the context of transfer and 
deployment of  knowledge based assets (KBAs) in foreign-owned affiliates (FOAs). Second, 
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institutional differences may influence the quality of inter-firm interactions and learning 
opportunities between FOAs and domestic firms in the host country. Higher level of 
institutional differences may hinder inter-firm collaboration resulting in weaker linkages 
between FOAs and domestic firms (Bellak, 2004). These institutional differences are more 
likely to influence domestic technological catch-up in emerging economies, where domestic 
firms are highly dependent on foreign technology and know-how of MNEs (Moran 2006; 
Perez 1997) . 
Marketing capabilities (MCs) of FOAs can also influence domestic technological 
catch-up. MCs reflect the extent to which interrelated organisational routines in FOAs 
enable engagement in specific marketing activities and respond to changes in markets 
conditions (Kamboj and Rahman, 2015; Murray et al. 2007). Capabilities related to 
deploying effective marketing practices is an important KBA since they enable FOAs to 
introduce and supply products effectively (Tan and Sousa 2015), achieve specific customers’ 
requirements and develop competitive advantages related to market sensing and customer 
linking (Krasnikov and Jayachandran, 2008). As such, MCs can play a critical role in 
improving the performance of FOAs (Czinkota and Ronkainen 2013) especially in the context 
of challenging market environments of developing economies (Helm and Gritsch 2014). 
However, marketing capabilities of FOAs are also likely to influence domestic firms’ through 
demonstration of the effectiveness of superior marketing practices and routines. These 
capabilities enables FOAs to increase output radically and exert a market-stealing effect 
through decrease in output and raising costs of domestic firms(Aitken and Harrison 1999). 
This effect, however, will induce domestic firms to invest in developing marketing channels to 
respond to foreign competition, especially in highly competitive product markets(Grewal et 
al. 2013). Thus, this process is likely to enable domestic firms to identify better learning 
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opportunities, innovate and reverse-engineer aspects of the marketing processes in FOAs to 
mitigate competitive pressures, thereby gradually catching up with FOAs within an industry.   
The role of foreign ownership modes is also considered very important in influencing 
domestic technological catch-up (Abraham, Konings, and Slootmaekers 2010; Javorcik and 
Spatareanu 2008). It has been argued that domestic technological catch-up from presence of 
foreign-owned joint ventures (JVs) may be higher than from wholly foreign-owned 
subsidiaries (WOS). This is because the relatively deeper linkages of domestic partners in 
JVs to other domestic firms provide an effective mechanism for the diffusion of technology to 
the latter. It was further found that WOS are used by MNEs to maintain control of their 
knowledge-based assets (KBAs) and limit domestic technological catch up(Javorcik and 
Spatareanu 2008). Within JV’s, differences exist between majority foreign owned joint 
ventures (MAJVs) and minority foreign owned joint ventures (MIJVs). The linkages that 
domestic partners in JVs have to other domestic firms may be stronger in MIJVs than 
MAJVs(Ramachandran V 1993). This is because the domestic partner which is locally self-
sufficient in relation to foreign partner in a MIJV has frequent and deeper interactions with 
local agents (domestic firms, suppliers etc.). As a result the potential for diffusion of 
knowledge from MIJV may be higher. MAJVs, on the other hand, may be more likely to 
receive newer and more advanced technologies than MIJVs. The enhanced transfer of 
knowledge to domestic partners of MAJVs may therefore permit access to a higher quantity 
and quality of KBAs than is the case for MIJVs.     
These three factors, namely, institutional differences, marketing capabilities and 
foreign ownership modes combined together provides us with a unique setting to investigate 
technological catch-up in the context of India. Whereas higher institutional differences 
between foreign firms’ home and host country negatively affects their host country 
performance (Shirodkar and Konara 2017), the impact of such institutional differences on 
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domestic firms is yet to be investigated. Moreover, FDI from institutionally close and 
institutionally distant markets may induce different inter-firm interactions and linkages 
between domestic and foreign firms. The study by conceptualising how institutional 
differences will also matter for technological catch up in domestic firms extends the existing 
literature. Moreover, by including role of marketing capabilities as a distinct knowledge-
based asset of foreign firms in emerging markets, and considering the level of generic foreign 
ownership in foreign firms, we adopt a contingency approach to unpack how they matter for 
domestic technological catch-up.  
This research study by incorporating the role of institutional differences and 
addressing two important firm heterogeneity issues that reinforces MNEs role in domestic 
catch-up, attempts to fill an important research gap in the existing literature. An investigation 
of these three factors jointly will enhance the conceptual understanding of FDI-mediated 
technological catch-up. The study also provides useful information for policy makers to 
enable them to better gear FDI policies to achieve development goals and for practitioners to 
consider means through which vulnerability of knowledge in emerging economies can be 
better understood and protected.  
The next section provides a literature review and introduces the hypotheses of the 
research study which is followed by the methodology section and data analysis. The study 
concludes with discussion of some of the key policy implications of the findings.  
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2. Literature Review  
2.1 Definition of technological catch-up 
The international business (IB) literature on FDI suggest that MNEs are endowed with 
ownership advantages, usually KBAs, in the form of new or advanced technologies and 
marketing and management know-how (Dunning and Lundan 2008). These KBAs can be 
leveraged by MNEs in host countries to overcome ‘liability of foreignness’. The transfer of 
KBAs from MNEs to FOAs enhances the existing knowledge stock of the host country and 
increases catch-up potential of domestic firms in the host country. In this process, 
technological catch up is defined as the impact generated from knowledge transfer to third 
parties (i.e. domestic and other foreign firms) who are not directly involved in an economic 
transaction with MNEs (Macdougall 1960). The channels of technological catch-up includes 
demonstration, labour mobility, and competition effects (Görg and Greenaway 2004).  
Given our focus on an emerging market context, we conducted an intensive literature 
review on published studies using firm level panel data for developing and emerging 
economies only. The findings are summarised in Table 1 illustrating the mixed evidence.  
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
2.2. Institutional Differences and FDI-Mediated Domestic Technological Catch-
up  
Institutional differences arise out of economic, finance, political, administrative, 
cultural and technological differences between the home and host country of MNEs (Berry, 
Guillén, and Zhou 2010). By using the concept of national innovation systems (hereafter 
NIS) (Lundvall 2010; Nelson 1993) in the host country and the likelihood of this being 
influenced by FDI from institutionally close and institutionally distant countries, we capture 
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differences in formal institutional systems (Estrin, Ionascu, and Meyer 2007) and how this 
will facilitate technological catch-up.  
The level of inter-firm interactions, including network connections between domestic 
and foreign firms is likely to be influenced by their embeddedness in the systems of national 
innovation (Castellacci and Natera 2013). Domestic firms may benefit additionally as a result 
of such interactions, especially when the home country NISs of foreign affiliates or FOAs 
with respect to engineering standards and specifications, technological development and 
technical educational systems are similar to the host country NISs (Joseph 2009). 
Consequently, FOAs will face lower (or higher) institutional differences, depending on their 
embeddedness in host country NISs, and this will influence their quality of interaction and 
knowledge transfer in the host country. For example, the prospects for technological catch-up 
by domestic firms through labour mobility may be higher when home country NISs of FOAs 
is similar to host country NISs (where domestic firms reside) as both types of firms 
(employers) and employees are familiar with the formal and informal arrangements that 
underpin employment contracts. This is also reflected in the approach to problem-solving and 
management techniques. Demonstration effects or reverse engineering is also facilitated 
through closer interactions between FOAs and domestic firms within NISs, especially in an 
industry that exhibits strong linkages of technologies and know-how between firms.  
Thus, greater similarities between NIS in which FOAs of MNEs and domestic firms 
are embedded in will enhance the level of interaction. This will permit domestic firms to be 
able to better absorb and acquire knowledge resulting from the interaction. Alternatively, 
when firms from different and relatively dissimilar NIS interact, greater institutional 
differences are bound to arise, which prevents deeper interaction between FOAs and 
domestic firms. Thus, the acquisition of knowledge by domestic firms would be limited.  
9 
The transfer of KBAs to FOAs enhances the pool of knowledge that is available for 
domestic technological catch-up (Dunning and Lundan 2008). However, when FOAs are 
embedded in host country NISs that are relatively dissimilar to its home country (i.e. facing 
high institutional differences), it may impede the transfer of KBAs due to high transaction 
costs (Gaur and Lu 2007; Wan and Hoskisson 2003). Thus, the lack of complementarities 
between FOAs’ home and host country NISs will result in high administrative institutional 
differences. Alternatively, the similarities in NISs will promote strategic coordination and 
governance among firms, both foreign and domestic alike. Therefore, countries with similar 
NISs can better facilitate firms in appropriating the advantages of these systems (Henisz and 
Zelner 2005). Conversely, the possibility of reaping the benefits from strategic coordination 
and governance are less likely for firms facing high institutional differences and therefore 
will hinder domestic technological catch-up. Based on the discussion above, we hypothesise 
that  
H1: Ceteris paribus, the lower the institutional differences between home and host country, 
the more likely domestic firms will be able to benefit through technological catch-up.   
2.3. Foreign ownership modes, and domestic technological catch-up 
The conventional argument suggests that technological catch up by domestic firms are 
likely to be higher through the presence of JVs relative to WOSs (Abraham et al. 2010; 
Javorcik and Spatareanu 2008). This is because the network connections of domestic partners 
in JVs provide an effective mechanism for diffusion of technology and know-how from 
FOAs to other domestic firms. WOS are used by MNEs to maintain control of their KBAs 
and prevent leakage of know-how (Desai, Foley and Hines 2005; Ramachandran V 1993) and 
this limits technology diffusion from WOS regulating the scope for catch-up.  
On one hand, the pool of knowledge that drives technological catch-up could be richer 
and deeper in WOS than in JVs because KBAs can be internalised through WOS (Buckley 
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and Casson 2010). Moreover, the perceived threat regarding leakage of KBAs is lesser in 
WOS than in JVs (Desai, Foley, and Hines 2004). Since WOSs provide more control over 
KBAs than JVs, MNEs are likely to transfer sophisticated technologies and know-how 
through WOS (Mansfield and Romeo 1980). MNEs may also commit more resources to 
transferring KBAs to WOS (Blomström and Sjöholm 1999) with the incentives to protecting 
KBAs likely to be better in WOS compared to JVs and this will also enhance the pool of 
knowledge that is available for domestic firms’ catch-up. On other hand, the linkages that 
domestic firms have with JVs are likely to be stronger than in WOSs. These linkages 
facilitates knowledge diffusion and they are likely to be strongest for tacit knowledge (Inkpen 
2000; Kogut and Zander 1993) because the interpersonal connections between domestic 
partners in JVs and other domestic firms facilitate the process (Görg and Greenaway 2004; 
Javorcik and Spatareanu 2008). However, there may be differences between MAJVs and 
MIJVs (Ramachandran V 1993). The linkages that domestic partners have with other 
domestic firms may be stronger in MIJVs than MAJVs (Dimelis and Louri 2004), because 
the domestic partner in MIJVs have frequent and deeper interactions with domestic agents 
(suppliers, distributors etc). As a result, the potential for diffusion of knowledge externalities 
may be higher in MIJVs. MAJVs, however, may receive newer and advanced technologies 
than MIJVs, thereby providing access to higher quality and quantity of KBAs than in MIJVs. 
Existing studies consider either MAJVs and MIJVs (Dimelis and Louri 2004) or WOSs and 
JVs without distinguishing between MAJVs and MIJVs (Abraham et al. 2010; Javorcik and 
Spatareanu 2008). A conceptualisation of key factors relating to foreign ownership modes 
which are important for technological catch-up are provided in Figure 1.  
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Fig.1 here 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
2.3.1. Joint effects of institutional differences and foreign ownership modes 
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We proposed earlier that lower institutional differences will facilitate effective 
transfer of KBAs to FOAs in the host country due to lower level of transaction costs and 
greater complementarities between home and host country institutional domains. WOSs also 
favour transfer of newer technologies and know-how than JVs as MNEs have tighter control 
of their KBAs in WOS (Mansfield and Romeo 1980). Thus, domestic firms are likely to have 
better access to higher quality and quantity of KBAs which will permit technological catch 
up. Furthermore, lower institutional differences would amplify interactions between domestic 
firms and FOAs including strategic coordination and governance because of complementary 
institutions. Thus, domestic firms are more likely to benefit from the high quality knowledge 
flows associated with WOSs.  
In the case of foreign-owned JVs, domestic partners of these JVs are connected with 
other domestic firms in the same industry through local market connections in the form of 
competitors, supply chain and distribution etc. On one hand, these local linkages are stronger 
in JVs than in WOS. Thus, the prospects for technological catch up in other domestic firms 
through diffusion of knowledge and proprietary know-how from JVs may be higher than in 
WOSs (Javorcik and Spatareanu 2008). On the other hand, relatively older technologies or 
know-how are transferred to JVs because of the need of MNEs to prevent appropriation of 
KBAs by domestic firms. As a result, domestic partners in JVs will have swifter access to 
KBAs, albeit of inferior quality, relative to WOSs. Within JVs, the linkages in MIJVs are 
likely to be strongest, compared to MAJVs, because of the dominant domestic partners in 
MIJVs and therefore the diffusion of technology and know-how may be swiftest. However, 
as discussed earlier, MIJVs are more likely to be characterised by inferior quality and volume 
of knowledge (KBAs) compared to MAJVs. Thus, when comparing JVs, MAJVs are more 
likely to be favourable for domestic technological catch-up as they benefit from intermediate 
level of knowledge pool and intermediate level of local linkages.  
12 
The indirect knowledge diffusion from domestic partners in JVs to other domestic 
firms are likely to be improved in the context of lower institutional differences. This is likely 
to boost effective transfer of knowledge flows to JVs because there are lesser institutional 
impediments to transfer and the foreign partners (through their stake in the JVs) are familiar 
with the local institutions, thereby promoting domestic catch-up. However, in the presence of 
lower institutional differences, MAJVs are more likely to contribute to domestic 
technological catch-up than MIJVs. In line with this argument, we propose that: 
H2: Ceteris paribus, the relationship between lower institutional differences and domestic 
technological catch up will be positively moderated by the presence of WOS and MAJVs 
relative to MIJVs.  
 
Higher institutional differences imply weaker complementarities arising from the NIS 
between home and host country of MNEs (Meyer et al. 2009) . These differences deter MNEs 
from effectively transferring KBAs to FOAs (Xu, Pan, and Beamish 2004). This effect is 
more likely to be significant for WOSs as they are highly dependent on KBAs provided by 
the parent MNEs. As a result, this will hinder the speed of transfer and quality of knowledge 
flows thereby not effectively contributing to the existing knowledge pool in host country. 
Thus, domestic technological catch-up effects from presence of WOS in the context of 
weaker institutional differences would be negligible.  
JVs, however, are less likely to be affected by higher institutional differences than 
WOS. The purpose of MNEs in collaborating with domestic partners is often to offset the 
barriers that emerge from high institutional differences (Chen and Hennart 2002). It is 
therefore quite possible that high institutional differences may not hinder MNEs in 
significantly transferring KBAs to JVs in the host country. However, the lack of 
complementarities between home and host country institutional domains (within a NIS 
context) may imply that the technology and know-how transferred to JVs could be of 
13 
intermediate quality than would be in the case of low institutional differences. Thus, JVs will 
contribute to knowledge stock characterised by low quality but highly relevant local 
knowledge that may better aid catch up in other domestic firms. The tighter linkages between 
domestic partners of MIJVs and other domestic firms make MIJVs even more likely to access 
locally relevant knowledge although the flow of KBAs to MIJVS would be lower and of 
poorer quality than MAJVs. In summary, for domestic technological catch-up in the context 
of high institutional differences, MAJVs (relative to WOSs and MIJVs) are likely to be more 
beneficial as they are characterised by the presence of both linkages and intermediate 
technology and know-how (KBAs). Accordingly, we hypothesis that: 
H3: Ceteris paribus, the relationship between higher institutional differences and domestic 
technological catch up will be positively moderated by the presence of MAJVs relative to 
WOSs and MIJVs. 
2.4. Marketing Capabilities and FDI-Mediated Domestic Technological Catch-Up 
The role of marketing capabilities in improving performance of FOAs is well 
established in the literature (Kamboj and Rahman 2015). In the challenging market context of 
emerging and developing economies, this capability is paramount to improving continuous 
performance (Konwar et al. 2017). MCs as an important KBA of MNEs may enable FOAs to 
introduce and supply products effectively (Tan and Sousa 2015), achieve specific customers’ 
requirements and develop competitive advantages related to market sensing and customer 
linking (Krasnikov and Jayachandran 2008). This is because marketing channels in emerging 
and developing economies are often underdeveloped and necessitates development of MCs to 
construct key elements of marketing channels to permit effective systems of delivering 
products.  
However, MCs in FOAs can also influence the extent of domestic technological catch 
up. A higher level of MCs reveal how superior marketing practices and routines in FOAs are 
effectual in their own output maximisation and exerting a market-stealing effect, thereby 
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decreasing output and raising costs of domestic firms (Aitken and Harrison 1999). This effect 
will induce domestic firms to invest in developing marketing channels to respond to foreign 
competition, especially in highly competitive product markets (Grewal et al. 2013). 
Gradually, this may enable domestic firms to identify better learning opportunities, innovate 
and reverse-engineer aspects of the marketing processes in FOAs to mitigate competitive 
pressures, thereby gradually catching up with FOAs within an industry. The superior 
demonstration of marketing capabilities by FOAs of MNEs and its subsequent adoption by 
domestic firms often occurs in an intangible way, which makes it difficult to capture how and 
where imitation and adoption of marketing practices by domestic firms take place 
(Blomström and Sjöholm 1999). We propose that marketing related domestic catch-up are 
likely to be driven by a combination of both competition (market-stealing) effect and 
demonstration effects.   
The role of MCs in influencing domestic catch-up is likely to be significant when 
FOAs and domestic firms compete within the same industry. This is because, as market 
commonality suggests, the motivation for domestic firms to imitate the marketing orientation 
of products and marketing processes of FOAs are more likely, due to product similarity or 
close resemblance of product design (Chen and Miller, 2012; Brambilla, Hale, and Long 
2009). In the case of emerging or developing economies, domestic firms are more likely to 
benefit from adoption of standardized knowledge through imitation because of the existence 
of a large skill gap between the domestic firms and FOAs (Meyer and Sinani 2009). In other 
words, imitation is an important mechanism through which domestic firms could learn to 
compete more effectively in emerging markets (Lu, Pattnaik, and Shi 2016). Thus, when 
FOAs are endowed with higher level of MCs, they will use sophisticated marketing practices 
to target specific customers and enhance their overall market position which may threaten the 
competitive position of domestic firms within an industry. Thus, domestic retaliation is likely 
15 
to include closer observation and imitation of products and processes of the focal foreign 
firm. As a result, the beneficial effects of observation and imitation are likely to enable them 
to learn wholly and quickly through adequate responses to foreign competition and improving 
their competitive market position. We therefore propose that: 
H4: Ceteris paribus, FOAs with a higher level of MCs (relative to FOAs with lower level) are 
more likely to be positively associated with domestic technological catch up.    
 
Figure 2 provides a conceptual framework of the key hypotheses (along with 
predicted sign) developed for institutional differences, foreign ownership modes, marketing 
capabilities and domestic technological catch-up.  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 




3.1. Data and Variable Measurement 
The research uses the Prowess database as it includes mostly large firms that are 
listed on India’s stock exchanges. Large domestic firms are better at adopting managerial 
best practices, including the introduction of new production techniques and management 
of human capital, as well as adopting innovations to improve firm productivity (Baptista, 
1999; Bloom and Van Reenen 2007). National Industrial Classification (NIC) 2008 code 
for the manufacturing sector is used in this study to categorise industrial groupings. We 
categorise a foreign firm as such when foreign equity equals to or is greater than 10% of 
the total equity. We adjust nominal data for sales, assets and expenditures using the GDP 
deflator and wholesale price index obtained from the Reserve Bank of India. 
Overall, there have been a significant increase in growth of FDI in India over the last 
decade. For example, the aggregate FDI inflows in 2005 was US$ 6051 million, increasing 
to US$ 37745 million in 2010 and stood at US$ 60082 million in 2017(DIPP 2018). This is 
also mirrored by a significant increase in technological activities of MNEs including the 
proportion of foreign R&D investment and new product development in India to cater to their 
global product mandate (Krishna, Patra, and Bhattacharya 2012). Within this changing 
industrial context, it is very important to understand the extent to which domestic firms are 
benefitting indirectly (through technological catch-up process) from the presence of foreign 
firms.  
In the data cleaning and inputting process, firms that did not report, or provided 
insufficient information on key economic activities were excluded. The final dataset contains 
1,624 firms with 5,203 observations covering the period of 1998-2014. 1,398 firms were 
domestic firms and 226 were foreign firms. A detailed breakdown is provided in the 
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appendix. The number of foreign firms in our sample is in line with Marin and Sasidharan 
(2010) that included 273 foreign firms from Prowess. Similar studies on the manufacturing 
sector in Argentina by Chudnovsky et al (2008) and Marin & Bell (2006) which had 145 and 
283 foreign firms respectively in their samples are more examples.   
India is a country with unique institutional (colonial and administrative) ties to Anglo-
Saxon countries. Although India is catching up swiftly in terms of higher innovation and 
technology standards, the nature of its NIS is closer to Anglo-Saxon countries because of 
colonial and administrative ties that drive modern scientific traditions and initiatives in 
science and technology policies (Arnold 2005). This is further evidenced from India’s 
colonial ties with the UK which has created national institutions such as rule of law, legal, 
administrative, political and financial systems that are similar to other Anglo-Saxon countries 
(Mueller 2006). India has a higher education establishment which is a cumulative 
combination of British and US educational systems, such as internal structure of universities, 
mode of knowledge delivery, classroom learning techniques and assessment methods(Joseph 
2009). In recent years, India has followed a policy of greater integration between technical 
universities and industrial knowledge intensive sectors that cater to the demands of the high 
skilled workforce. This is similar to the American system of setting up closer ties through 
knowledge clusters between educational institutions and industrial sectors. Furthermore, 
language is an important aspect which binds India closer to Anglo-Saxon countries. The 
medium of instruction in public and private universities is English and the same is used for 
administrative purposes, whether at the national or regional level. Linguistic similarities can 
also minimise the difficulties associated with transferring tacit know-how as well as 
transmitting prescriptive knowledge (Polanyi 1958). Thus, India in having closer institutional 
ties to Anglo-Saxon countries is in a better position to reap benefits associated with 
knowledge flows from FDI. Alternatively, the knowledge flows emerging from FDI from 
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non-Anglo-Saxon countries are less likely to be beneficial because of the dissimilarities of 
the NIS between these groups and India. In order to capture these broad institutional 
differences, we categorise our FDI sample into foreign firms from Anglo-Saxon and Non-
Anglo Saxon countries
i
.    
We use marketing intensity (i.e. marketing expenditures as a total of foreign firms’ 
sales) to capture marketing capabilities of FOAs. Marketing expenditures include firms’ 
commissions, rebates, discounts and promotional sales, expenses on direct selling agents and 
entertainment expenses (CMIE 2015). The marketing intensity variable is a good measure to 
capture the capabilities associated with selling (Griffith, Yalcinkaya, and Calantone 2010), 
promotion (Troilo, De Luca, and Guenzi 2009) and skills associated with segmenting and 
targeting markets(DeSarbo et al. 2005). Thus, this measure captures the ‘historical dynamics 
in investment levels’ in marketing expenditures (Kor and Mahoney 2005). The international 
business (IB) literature heavily relies on marketing intensity as a proxy for MCs (Kotabe, 
Srinivasan, and Aulakh 2002). We split the FDI sample into foreign firms with higher and 
lower marketing intensity by adopting a threshold. Since we cannot be sure what constitutes a 
high marketing intensity in the context of India, we experiment with two cut-off points: the 
top quartile and the top 10% of each distribution following a similar approach to capture high 
R&D and export intensity in Marin and Sashidharan (2010).  
3.2. Panel data estimation (2-stages) 
Following highly cited research on technological catch-up in India (Marin and 
Sasidharan 2010) and China (Wang et al. 2012), we use a 2-stage estimation process. In the 
first stage, we compute the dependent variable required for the study. Assessment of 
technological catch-up in domestic firms requires the estimate of a firm’s total factor 
productivity (TFP). Using the ordinary least squares (OLS) technique to estimate TFP suffers 
from simultaneity bias since it treats labour and capital inputs as exogenous and ignores time-
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invariant and firm-specific characteristics (Levinsohn and Petrin 2003). Moreover, problems 
of estimation leading to endogeneity can arise if firms adjust their inputs according to their 
expectations about economic conditions, leading to the possibility that idiosyncratic shocks in 
productivity are captured in the error term (Griliches and Mairesse 1995). The Levinsohn and 
Petrin (2003) approach, henceforth the LP method, is commonly used to overcome this 
potential endogeneity problem in estimation of TFP (Javorcik and Spatareanu 2008; Liu, 
Wang, and Wei 2009). The LP technique is easier to implement than the alternate method by 
Olley and Pakes (1992) because there is no prerequisite for evidence on firm entry and exit 
and no evidence of loss subsequent from negative tenets in the proxy investment variable.  
The LP method of estimating TFP for 2-digit industry production functions offers the data for 
the dependent variable, TFP of domestic firms.  
In the second stage, we relate the TFP of domestic firms to measures (i.e. proxies) of 
foreign presence or foreign participation using a fixed effects model estimated in first 
differences. We control for the competitive characteristics of industries and key conditions in 
domestic firms that affect absorptive capacity.  
The baseline model is: 
lnTFPijt = α0 + α1FORFPASjt-1 + α2FORFPNASjt-1 + α3HHIjt-1 + α4IMPjt-1 + α5RDijt-1 + 
α6SCALEijt-1 + µijt     (1) 
Where lnTFPijt is the logarithm of the TFP of domestic firm i in industry j at time t. 
FORFPAS and FORFPNAS are foreign presence from Anglo-Saxon countries and foreign 
presence from non-Anglo-Saxon countries respectively.  
Following Wei and Liu (2006) and Liu et al.(2009), we use different measures to 
capture FDI-mediated domestic catch-up effects (FORFP), namely, foreign presence 
measured through employment, foreign presence measured through domestic sales and 
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foreign presence measured through fixed assets in the industry. Consistent with recent 
research, this approach enables us to maximise the detection of FDI-mediated domestic 
catch-up (Wang et al., 2012).  
FORFPAS captures FDI catch-up effects from FOAs whose home country is 
institutionally close to India and is measured by the share of Anglo-Saxon FOAs’ employee 
compensation in the 3-digit industry (Employment), the share of domestic sales by Anglo-
Saxon FOAs in the 3-digit industry (Domestic Sales) and the share of Anglo-Saxon FOAs’ 
fixed assets in the 3-digit industry (Fixed Assets). Similarly, FORFPNAS captures FDI catch-
up effects from FOAs whose home country is institutionally different to India, and is 
measured by the share of non-Anglo-Saxon MNEs in 3 digit industry (domestic sales, fixed 
assets and employment compensation). HHI (Herfindahl index of concentration) and IMP 
(import penetration ratio) are the two industry level proxies for industry competitive 
conditions. The domestic firms’ RD (R&D intensity) and SCALE (firm scale) are two firm 
level variables acting as proxies for absorptive capacity of domestic firms. All right-hand 
variables are lagged by one year which deals with the impending justification that 
technological catch-up will not increase instantaneously.  
To estimate the role of foreign firms’ marketing capabilities in domestic catch-up, we 
use the following estimation model in equation 2: 
lnTFPijt = α0 + α1FORHMCjt-1 + α2FORLMCjt-1 + α3HHIjt-1 + α4IMPjt-1 + α5RDijt-1 + 
α6SCALEijt-1 + µijt           (2) 
Where FORHMC and FORLMC represents foreign presence with both high and low 
marketing capabilities respectively. As before, three different measures of foreign presence 
are used, i.e. employment, domestic sales and fixed assets of foreign firms.  
In this study, we also seek to assess the moderating role of foreign ownership modes 
which are categorised by:(1) wholly owned subsidiaries (WOS), where the MNE has 100% 
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promoter’s equity; (2) majority joint-ventures (MAJV), where the MNE has 51% to 99% 
promoter’s equity, and (3) minority joint-ventures (MIJV), where the MNE’s promoter’s 
equity is from 10%-50%.  
The study measures technological catch-up from WOS, MAJV and MIJV using the 
same method as used in equation 1 (catch up through FDI), i.e. by shifting the shares of all 
MNEs to the shares of WOS, MAJV and MIJV in the 3-digit industry, respectively. 
Comprehensive variable measurements are provided in the appendix. Thus, the inclusion of 
these variables leads to the following model: 
lnTFPijt = α0 + α1WOSFPASjt-1 + α2MAJVFPASjt-1 + α3MIJVFPASjt-1  + α4WOSFPNASjt-1 + 
α5MAJVFPNASjt-1 + α6MIJVFPNASjt-1  α7HHIjt-1 + α8IMPjt-1 + α9RDijt-1 + α10SCALEijt-1 + µijt 
            (3) 
We utilize fixed effects model in Stata to estimate equations (1), (2) and (3) with 
corrections for heteroskedasticity and for clustering at the industry - year level to account for 
correlations between firm observations within the same industry - year (Wooldridge 2010). 
We also conducted the Hausman test in Stata and found that the fixed effects estimator is 
appropriate in comparison with random effects estimator. It is quite possible that other 
factors might be connected to correlations between foreign presence and productivity. These 
factors could be assumed to be fixed, such as firm-, year-, industry-, and region-specific 
factors and might be connected to more micro-level determinants such as organisational 
culture, available opportunities regarding technology in an industry or macro-level factors 
such as external policy shocks and infrastructure conditions. To control for these fixed 
effects, the year-, industry-, and region-dummies are used in a fixed effects panel data model.  
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4. Data analysis and discussion 
Table 2 provides the key summary statistics and correlation matrix. It is seen that there are no 
severe issues related to multicollinearity. We also inspected the variance inflation factors 
(VIF) and observe that none of the variables exceed more than 2.0 (Mansfield and Helms 
1982). The results for domestic technological catch-up estimated in equations 1 and 2 are 
presented in Table 3. The difference between each column lies in the use of different 
measures of FDI-mediated domestic catch-up variable. Column 1 uses the share of foreign-
owned firms’ employment in total employment, column 2 the share of domestic sales 
accounted for by foreign-owned firms’ to total domestic sales and column 3 the share of 
foreign-owned firms’ fixed assets to total fixed assets in the industry.  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 2 & 3 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 3 (columns 1 to 3) reveals that technological catch-up in domestic firms which 
are driven by presence of foreign firms entering from institutionally close countries 
(FORFPAS) are positive and significant for all the measures used. However, FORFPNAS is 
not statistically significant. This result supports our first hypothesis H1. The coefficient for 
FORHMC is positive and significant (for domestic sales and fixed assets measure) but it is 
not significant for FORLMC. This suggests that marketing capabilities as an important KBA 
used by FOAs can drive domestic technological catch-up and thereby supports hypothesis 
H4. In studies of FDI-mediated technological catch-up in India, the results from Banga 
(2006) and Marin and Sasidaran (2010) can be compared to our findings. Banga (2006), using 
data from 1985-1990, finds that Japanese investment is more likely to generate domestic 
catch-up than US investment. This is contradicted to our finding where MNEs from 
institutionally close countries (such as US) have a positive effect and those from 
institutionally distant countries have an insignificant effect. This is not surprising because 
Banga (2006) study covers period before liberalisation while this research study covers post-
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liberalisation period. Kathuria (2002) study of the effect of liberalisation reports that 
technological catch-up have increased during the liberal regime for those domestic firms 
actively engaging in R&D. Marin and Sasidaran (2010)’s findings are closer to ours which 
finds that ‘the technological catch-up effect driven by FDI with greater linkages with the 
innovation system is positive and significant’. The difference between their approach and 
ours lies on the fact that they use firm level information, i.e. royalty payments to construct a 
proxy of embeddedness inside the innovation system (IS) of the host country, and group 
firms accordingly while ours is based on a macro-level proxy, i.e. Anglo-Saxon countries vs. 
non Anglo-Saxon countries. Also, we use listed firms which are large in size and often 
actively engaging with R&D activities. This implies that the absorptive capacity and 
innovation capability of domestic firms in our data, though lower than those of foreign firms, 
are of respectable standard and more likely to be above the technological threshold for catch-
up to be facilitated. In this regard, our findings that positive intra-industry technological 
catch-up in the context of low institutional differences is certainly plausible. This is also in 
line with the findings by Pradhan (2004) that ‘the presence of foreign firms per se may not be 
important for productivity growth of domestic firms unless it is complemented by the latter’s 
R&D activity or size’. In addition, our results further add an interesting context that high 
level of marketing capabilities in FOAs may have beneficial effects as domestic firms are 
more motivated to engage in imitation and learning.   
 
We further investigated the joint effect of institutional differences and foreign 
ownership modes. Equation 3 is estimated, and the results are presented in Table 4. The 
coefficients on WOS from Anglo-Saxon countries are positive and significant for all 
measures (columns 1-3). In contrast, coefficients on MAJVs and MIJVs from Anglo-Saxon 
countries are positive and significant only for one measure each through fixed assets 
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measure; the coefficient on MIJVs from Anglo-Saxon countries is negative and statistically 
significant. The latter result may be an indication that when countries are institutionally 
closer, WOS will provide with the highest prospects for technological catch-up than other 
FDI ownership modes. Also, MAJVs are more likely to be a better ownership mode for 
knowledge diffusion to domestic firms than MIJVs as the latter is associated with a negative 
(and highly significant) effect.   
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
It is seen that when foreign ownership modes are considered under high institutional 
distance, the significance for JVs are much more compared to WOS. The coefficient for 
MAJVs suggest a positive and highly significant effect whereas MIJVs have a negative and 
significant effect with the fixed assets measure. This evidence on the moderating effect of 
foreign ownership modes on institutional distance fully supports the second hypothesis (H2) 
and there is partial support for H3. The reason for MAJVs being the only foreign ownership 
mode (in the context of high institutional differences) associated with positive and significant 
effect (with assets measure) could be explained by the role that FOAs play in diffusion of 
knowledge when a domestic partner from an institutionally distant country is used. The close 
linkages that domestic partner of a MAJV has with other domestic firms could also be a 
crucial factor when the foreign affiliate is institutionally distant and unfamiliar with the local 
environment.  
Following the method used in Wei and Liu (2006), we adopt a principle components 
approach to combine all indicators into a ‘grand’ composite index. The rationale behind the 
use of a grand composite index is that one measure of domestic technological catch-up (for 
example, domestic sales) is likely to explore only a distinct aspect or channel rather than 
technological catch-up from foreign presence (FDI) comprehensively. The first factor from 
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the principle component is identified and it explains more than 74% of the variance of these 
three indicators. The results are shown in the fourth column. It shows that, with all other 
things remaining constant, domestic firms benefit from the presence of foreign firms through 
technological catch-up.       
The current evidence from this paper contradicts existing studies which have looked 
at the role of foreign ownership modes. In the case of China, it was found that JVs are more 
likely to be associated with positive spillovers than WOSs (Abraham et al. 2010; Tian 2010). 
In our case, it is WOS which have relatively higher effects than both MAJVs and MIJVs. The 
evidence regarding MIJV’s in our study is negative and significant which also contradicts 
earlier studies by Dimelis and Louri (2004). However, our findings are partially in line with  
Mansfield and Romeo (1980), Ramachandran (1993), Javorcik (2008) and Almeida and 
Fernandes (2008) which suggests that MNEs are more likely to transfer advanced 
technologies and know-how to WOSs. Different from these studies, our approach takes into 
consideration the mediating role that institutional differences can play in technological catch-
up from foreign firm with different level of ownerships in the host country and uses data 
which only covers listed firms whose absorptive and innovative capability are relatively high. 
Our findings assert the importance of institutional ties between the FDI home and host 
country as well as foreign ownership and demonstrate that the similarities in formal and 
regulatory frameworks between an emerging host country and its institutionally close 
countries could bring about positive technological benefits through FDI with high level of 
foreign ownership.   
Conclusion 
The findings reported in this paper add to the growing stream of literature that suggests that 
models of FDI-mediated technological catch-up need further development to enable better 
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identification (Crespo and Fontoura 2007). The evidence from this paper points towards the 
fact that technological catch-up are conditional on foreign ownership modes and marketing 
capabilities of FOAs and institutional distance between the home and host country of MNEs. 
Positive intra-industry technological catch-up exist only for WOS and MAJVs from Anglo-
Saxon firms (i.e. firms facing lower institutional distance) whereas in the case of Non-Anglo-
Saxon firms (i.e. firms facing higher institutional distance), MAJVs are the most important 
driver of technological catch-up. Higher marketing capabilities in foreign affiliates also plays 
an important role in domestic catch-up and we find evidence to document this proposition in 
our study. We also find negative effects from MIJVs from Anglo-Saxon firms, with limited 
evidence that positive catch-up effects arise from MIJVs too. The results suggest that a 
contingency approach, based on a fuller classification of foreign ownership modes than is 
normally used in the literature, consideration of MCs and the facilitation of catch up 
conferred by institutional differences enables a more detailed identification than seems to be 
the case in more aggregated studies.   
The interpretation of the arguments and results presented in this paper require caution. 
First, our findings draw on a specific sample of firms of the Indian economy, i.e. large listed 
firms in the manufacturing industry whose absorptive and innovative capability are relatively 
high. Therefore, any generalisation from this in terms of both sector and firm selection needs 
caution. Second, our study focuses on analysis of one aspect of institutional differences, i.e. 
differences in NIS frameworks and uses Anglo-Saxon vs. non-Anglo-Saxon country 
classification to capture the institutional differences. However, it could be argued that other 
institutions e.g. contract enforcement are also important for catch-up, as they affect MNEs 
operations, technology transfer and transfer of know-how to its affiliate and domestic firms in 
the host country. In future, more direct measures of institutional differences could be used in 
to investigate catch-up effects. Finally, although our study takes measures to mitigate 
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endogeneity, a more effective solution involves using datasets that cover a longer period and 
contain information on effective instrumental variables. 
Despite the limitations listed above, we believe our findings could feed well into   
discussions of FDI and its related public affairs polices. In recent years, these policies 
attracted FDI in developing countries and presumed that JVs are more likely to beneficial for 
catch-up. Our results, however, demonstrate that domestic firms that are large and innovative 
in nature could benefit more from the presence of WOS in the case of institutional similarities 
between home and host country. This is not to say that only FDI in the form of WOS and 
from institutional close countries are welcomed in the host country. Rather, we believe it is 
important to take into considerations foreign firm heterogeneities in terms of ownership, 
depth of capabilities (especially marketing related) and institutions in which they embed and 
domestic firm heterogeneities in terms of size, absorptive capability and consequently design 
and implement policies which are not discriminating against any types of firms, foreign or 
domestic. Early liberalised countries including Hong Kong, Singapore and Ireland have 
showed the way on this regard and late comers including India and some of Eastern European 
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Appendix A: Variable definition and measurment 
Variable Definition and measurment 
LTFP Logarithm of Total Factor Productivity (TFP) 
(FORFPAS/ 
FORFPNAS) 
Technological catch-up variable proxied by share of foreign affiliates 
from Anglo Saxon/ Non Anglo-Saxon countries in a 3-digit industry, 
excluding the focal firm.   
(FORHMC/ 
FORLMC) 
Technological catch-up variable proxied by share of foreign affiliates 
with high/low marketing intensity in a 3-digit industry, excluding the 
focal firm.   
WOSFPAS/ 
WOSFPNAS 
Technological catch-up variable proxied by share of wholly-owned 
foreign firms from Anglo-Saxon/ Non-Anglo Saxon countries to 
total foreign firms in the industry  
MAJVFPAS/ 
MAJVFPNAS 
Technological catch-up variable proxied by share of majority-owned 
joint ventures from Anglo-Saxon/ Non Anglo-Saxon countries to 
total foreign firms in the industry 
MIVJVFPAS/ 
MIJVFPNAS 
Technological catch-up variable proxied by share of minority-owned 
joint ventures from Anglo-Saxon/ Non Anglo-Saxon countries to 
total foreign firms in the industry 
HHI The sum of squared firm shares of sales in a 3-digit industry 
IMP The ratio of imports to domestic demand in a 3-digit industry 
RDINT The ratio of domestic firm’s R&D expenses to sales 




Appendix B: Distribution of foreign and domestic firms’ obervations (1998-2014; 
manufacturing sector) 
Time-period Nos. of foreign firm 
observations  
 Nos. of domestic firm 
observations 
1998 14  79  
1999 21   134  
2000 24   104  
2001 18   89  
2002 54   357  
2003 72  446  
2004 61   402  
2005 58   345   
2006 58  369  
2007 72  446  
2008 50  312  
2009 36  223  
2010 29  167  
2011 35  189  
2012 36  223  
2013 43  267  
2014 58  312  
 N=739 N=4464 
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Table 1: Summary of research findings in developing and emerging economies 1 
Sl. No. Country  Authors  Sample  Findings
2
 Factors that affect catch-up  




- Lesser technological capabilities of MNE subsidiaries  
2 Argentina (Chudnovsky et 
al. 2008)  
1992-
2001 
*/+ Improved absorptive capacity of domestic firms 
3 China (Liu et al. 2009)  1998-
2001 
+ Higher technological capabilities of domestic firms 




+ Higher level of technological capabilities  
5 China (Liu 2002)  1993-95 + Enhanced technical capabilities of domestic firms 
6 China (Tian 2007)  1996-99 + Tangible assets exert a stronger positive effect 
7 China (Tian 2010)  1996-99 + Employment of unskilled labour and engagement of 
intangible assets (input) along with locally sold products 
and not newly developed products (output)  
8 India (Kathuria 2001)  1976-89 + Higher R&D capabilities of domestic firms 
9 India (Kathuria 2002)  1990-97 - Lack of R&D capabilities of domestic firms 
10 India (Siddharthan and 
Weekly 2004)  
1993-
2000 
+ Improved absorptive capacities of domestic firms 
11 India  (Banga 2006)  1985-90 + Nationality of the foreign investor  
12 India (Marin and 
Sasidharan 2010)  
1994-
2002 
+/- Competence creating MNE subsidiaries generate positive 
while competence exploiting subsidiaries generate overall 
negative effects 
13 India (Iyer 2009)  1989-
2004 
+/- Strong industry effect due to nature of competition in each 
industry 
14 Indonesia (Blalock and 
Gertler 2004)  
1988-96 * Lack of absorptive capacity 
15 Lithuania (Javorcik 2004)  1996-
2000 
* Partially-owned foreign projects lead to greater vertical 
spillovers than wholly-owned projects 
16 Morocco (Haddad and 
Harrison 1993)  
1985-89 - Negative competition effects 
17 Poland (Zukowska-
Gagelmann 2000)  
1993-97 - Negative competition effects 
18 Romania (Javorcik and 
Spatareanu 2008)  
1998-
2003 
+ JV’s generate positive significant spillover benefits than 
WOS 
19 Russia (Yudaeva et al. 
2003)  
1992-97 + Better absorptive capacity leading to positive significant 















Negative competition effects/ Lack of firms’ restructuring 
Lack of firms’ restructuring (lot of missing observations) 










MNEs operating in labour intensive sectors gives rise to 
horizontal spillovers whereas that operating in high-tech 
sectors gives rise to vertical spillovers 
Size of domestic firms moderates spillover effect 
22 Venezuela (Aitken and 
Harrison 1999)  
1976-89 - Negative competition effects 
23 Zambia (Bwalya 2006)  1993-95 -/+ No horizontal spillovers due to insufficient absorptive 
capacity and negative competition effects.  
                                                          
1
 The definition of developing and emerging economies follows World Economic Outlook Report (2010) 
published by the International Monetary Fund 
(http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2010/01/weodata/groups.htm#oem). 
2
 +, -, and * denotes positive, negative and insignificant effects respectively  
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Table 2 (Correlation matrix) 
 
 Mean s.d.  1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 
1. LTFP 1.55 1.59             
2. FORFPAS 0.16 0.18 0.13            
3. FORFPNAS 0.08 0.13 -0.02 0.29           
4. WOSFPAS  0.06 0.09 0.00 0.45 0.08          
5. MAJVFPAS 0.09 0.15 0.18 0.78 0.30 -0.07         
6. MIJVFPAS 0.01 0.06 -0.06 0.32 -0.01 0.00 -0.07        
7. WOSFPNAS  0.06 0.11 0.05 0.29 0.93 0.10 0.30 -0.02       
8. MAJVFPNAS 0.01 0.04 -0.09 0.07 0.49 -0.01 0.07 0.06 0.19      
9. MIJVFPNAS 0.00 0.02 -0.16 0.08 0.18 -0.01 0.11 -0.02 -0.01 0.04     
10. HHI 0.21 0.20 -0.22 -0.13 -0.14 -0.20 -0.02 -0.04 -0.15 0.00 -0.03    
11. IMP 0.05 0.09 0.01 -0.13 0.06 0.04 -0.14 -0.07 0.02 0.16 -0.03 -0.04   
12. RDINTEN  0.00 0.06 -0.02 0.03 0.03 -0.01 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.00  
13. SCALE 0.86 2.46 0.03 -0.07 -0.07 -0.03 -0.07 0.00 -0.07 -0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 -0.01 
s.d. = standard deviation. All technological catch up variables are measured by foreign employment compensation.  
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Table 3. Domestic Technological Catch-up Effects from Institutional Differences and 
Marketing Capabilities  
 










by Fixed Assets 
First factor from 
principal 
component 
analysis based on 
employment, 
domestic sales 
and fixed assets 
FORFPAS 0.136** 0.001*** 0.136* 0.017** 
 [0.064] [0.000] [0.077] [0.008] 
FORFPNAS -0.118 -0.073 0.060 -0.006 


























 [0.062] [0.062] [0.062] [0.062] 
IMP 0.114 0.094 0.091 0.119 





0.070** 0.063** 0.054* 0.060* 
 [0.035] [0.030] [0.030] [0.031] 
SCALE 0.015** 0.015** 0.015** 0.015*** 
 [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] 
Industry 
effects 
yes yes yes yes 
Region effects yes yes yes yes 
















Dependent variable is the logged TFP calculated using Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) procedure.  
Key variables are lagged one year. 
Robust standard errors clustered by industry-year in brackets.  
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
No. of firms = 1398. 
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Table 4. Joint Effects of Institutions and Foreign Ownership on Domestic Technological 
Catch-up  
 



















and fixed assets 
WOSFPAS  0.232** 0.001*** 0.361** 0.017** 
 [0.107] [0.000] [0.173] [0.007] 
MAJVFPAS 0.118 0.073 0.198** 0.013** 
 [0.073] [0.058] [0.077] [0.006] 
MIJVFPAS 0.000 0.355* -0.592*** -0.002 
 [0.242] [0.183] [0.217] [0.010] 
WOSFPNAS  -0.208 -0.049 -0.023 -0.007 
 [0.174] [0.083] [0.116] [0.011] 
MAJVFPNAS 0.216 -0.091 0.470*** 0.011 
 [0.194] [0.063] [0.157] [0.009] 
MIJVFPNAS -0.626 -0.089 -0.324** -0.011 
 [0.381] [0.379] [0.156] [0.007] 
HHI 0.200*** 0.183*** 0.198*** 0.192*** 
 [0.067] [0.070] [0.063] [0.069] 
IMP 0.095 0.120 0.054 0.105 
 [0.097] [0.094] [0.078] [0.091] 
RDINTEN (*10
-3
) 0.076** 0.060** 0.064* 0.063* 
 [0.036] [0.030] [0.036] [0.032] 
SCALE 0.015** 0.015*** 0.017*** 0.016*** 
 [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] 
Industry effects yes yes yes yes 
Region effects yes yes yes yes 
















Dependent variable is the logged TFP calculated using Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) procedure.  
Key variables are lagged one year. 
Robust standard errors clustered by industry-year in brackets.  
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
No. of firms = 1398. 
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Figure 1: Author's schematisation of interplay between key factors relating to foreign 
ownership modes that drive domestic technological catch up 
 




















                                                          
i
 To capture our primary explanatory variable, i.e. institutional differences, we classified the FDI sample into 
developed country FDI from Anglo-Saxon and developed country FDI from non Anglo-Saxon countries. FDI 
from Anglo-Saxon countries include foreign firms originating from AUSTRALIA, CANADA, UNITED 
KINGDOM, UNITED STATES of AMERICA, NEW ZEALAND and IRELAND. FDI from non Anglo-Saxon 
countries include foreign firms originating from BELGIUM, DENMARK, FINLAND, FRANCE, GERMANY, 
ITALY, JAPAN, NETHERLANDS, SOUTH KOREA, SPAIN, SWEDEN, SWITZERLAND, TAIWAN, UAE and 
HONG KONG. We excluded foreign firms originating from MAURITUS and LIECHTENSTEIN as these 
countries are regarded as tax havens and are not likely to be genuine sources of inward foreign capital and 
technological investments. We also exclude the handful of foreign firms from BANGLADESH as it is a 
developing country.    
Ownership Modes 
Key factors 
MIJVs MAJVs WOSs 
Knowledge pools 
(KBAs) 
Low Intermediate High 
Linkages (network 
connections) 
High Intermediate Low 
